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The California Constitution and the
California Supreme Court in Conflict
Over the Harmless Error Rule
By Angus M. MacLeod*
Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution governs
the determination of whether nonfederal error has resulted in
prejudice to the appellant that requires reversal on appeal.1 The
"harmless error rule" in California, then, is not a judicially created
rule, subject to revision or rejection by the judiciary; rather, it is
part of the state constitution, to be interpreted but not ignored by
California appellate courts. With respect to certain types of jury
instruction error, however, the California Supreme Court has effec-
tively abrogated the state constitutional rule on harmless error.
This Note first demonstrates by case analysis that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court often has ignored the constitutional mandate of
article VI, section 13. The Note then discusses the harms and ben-
efits that have resulted from the court's departure from the consti-
tutional rule and concludes that the harms outweigh the benefits.2
* B.A., 1976, University of California, Los Angeles. Member, Third Year Class.
1. Article VI, § 13 was adopted in 1911 for application to criminal cases as art. VI,
§ 41/2. It was amended in 1914 to apply to all cases. When the California Constitution was
reorganized in 1966, the section became art. VI, § 13.
Article VI, § 13 does not apply to federal constitutional error because it is more lenient
than the minimum standard for review of such error established by Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Court in Chapman held that "before a federal constitutional error
can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24 (emphasis added). This is more rigorous than the California
standard of reasonable probability that a result more favorable to the appellant would have
occurred absent the error. People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (1956)
(interpreting CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4%). See text accompanying notes 11-14 infra.
Federal constitutional error is beyond the scope of this Note. For discussion of the
Chapman rule, see Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman
v. California, 53 MIN. L. Rav. 519 (1969); Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Re-
appraisal, 83 HARv. L. REv. 814 (1970).
2. An excellent analysis of the competing policies in harmless error is found in R.
TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE or HARMLESs ERROR (1970) [hereinafter cited as TRAYNOR]. A good
discussion of the various standards used in reviewing error appears in Saltzburg, The Harm
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Article VI, Section 13 and People v. Watson
Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution states:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any
cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the im-
proper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to
any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of proce-
dure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including
the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error com-
plained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice5
The language of the section establishes the scope of its appli-
cation and the scope of the requisite inquiry by an appellate court.
By its terms article VI, section 13 applies to "any cause," civil or
criminal,4 and applies to appellate review of any error except fed-
eral constitutional error.5 The cases analyzed in this Note all con-
cern the California Supreme Court's treatment of jury instruction
error; the section expressly is applicable to cases of "misdirection
of the jury."
Until 1911, when California's first harmless error rule was
adopted by constitutional amendment, California appellate courts
presumed that any error, however trivial, required reversal.6 Courts
believed that they lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court re-
cord to determine the effect of an error,7 or that the effect of an
error could not be determined from the record.8 Therefore, when a
court found error, it presumed prejudice. The public perceived this
as an abuse of the justice system; in response, it voted the present
harmless error provision into the state constitution.9 The new pro-
vision abrogated the old rule that prejudice was to be presumed
of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. Rav. 988 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Saltzburg].
3. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 13 (emphasis added).
4. Article VI, § 41/2, as adopted in 1911, applied only to criminal cases. It was amended
in 1914 to encompass "any cause." See People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 834, 299 P.2d 243,
253 (1956).
5. See note 1 supra.
6. People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 834, 299 P.2d 243, 253 (1956). Justice Traynor
points out an extreme example of this policy: in 1880, the California Supreme Court re-
versed a conviction because "larceny" had been misspelled "larcey" in an indictment.
People v. St. Clair, 56 Cal. 406 (1880). See TRAYNOR, supra note 2, at 3-4. Justice Traynor
also provides a brief history of harmless error in this country and in England. Id. at 3-14.
7. Vallejo & N. R.R. v. Reed Orchard Co., 169 Cal. 545, 554, 144 P. 238, 243 (1915).
8. San Jose Ranch Co. v. San Jose Land & Water Co., 126 Cal. 322, 325, 58 P. 824, 825
(1899).




Article VI, section 13 prescribes two prerequisites for reversal.
First, the appellate court must review "the entire cause, including
the evidence." Second, the court must find that an error "has re-
sulted in a miscarriage of justice." It should be noted that a rule
that certain errors are per se grounds for reversal cannot be con-
sistent with the requirement that an appellate court must examine
"the entire cause, including the evidence." A rule of prejudice per
se orders reversal based on only one part of the record-the er-
ror-rather than on an examination of the entire record.
In People v. Watson,"" the California Supreme Court defined
the broad term "miscarriage of justice" as used in article VI, sec-
tion 13: "A 'miscarriage of justice' should be declared only when
the court, 'after an examination of the entire cause, including the
evidence,' is of the 'opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error. '12 Thus, as interpreted in
Watson, article VI, section 13 allows an appellate court to reverse
a verdict only if it first finds that the result probably would have
been different had the error not occurred; otherwise, article VI,
section 13 will not permit reversal.'3 The court in Watson empha-
10. See People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 835, 299 P.2d 243, 253-54 (1956).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 836, 299 P. 2d at 254 (emphasis added). The Watson court synthesized its
rule after examining a number of previous cases in which the wording varies slightly. See,
e.g., People v. Putnam, 20 Cal. 2d 885, 892, 129 P.2d 367, 371 (1942); People v. Watts, 198
Cal. 776, 793, 247 P. 884, 890 (1926).
Although harmless error procedures apply in the same way to civil and criminal cases,
most of the major cases, such as Watson, have been criminal. See 6 B. WrrITN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE 4297 (1971). However, Watson is cited often in civil cases. See, e.g., Aceves v.
Regal Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 512, 595 P.2d 619, 624, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41, 46 (1979);
Clifton v. Ulis, 17 Cal. 3d 99, 105-06, 549 P. 2d 1251, 1255, 130 Cal. Rptr. 155, 159 (1976).
13. The positive language of art. VI, § 13 and of Watson makes it necessary for a court
to form the opinion before ordering reversal rather than, for example, merely being unable
to conclude that a miscarriage has not occurred. Small changes in the wording of the rule,
however, can have substantial impact on the effect of the rule. For example, in People v.
Kelso, 25 Cal. 2d 848, 853, 155 P.2d 819, 822 (1945), a case discussed in Watson, the court
stated that there should be no reversal if the court is of the opinion a different verdict
would not have been probable. The Watson rule, on the other hand, dictates that the court
should reverse only when a different result would have been probable. The use of the double
negative in Kelso changes the effect of the rule in.the fairly common case when the court
cannot reach any opinion on the probability of a different verdict. Applying Kelso, the court
may then reverse, because it has failed to reach the opinion that a different result would not
have been probable. Applying Watson, the court may not reverse, because it has failed to
reach the opinion that a different result would have been probable.
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sized that reasonable probability, not mere possibility, of a differ-
ent result is required to overturn a trial court verdict.14
Categories of Jury Instruction Error and Article
VI, Section 13
The California Supreme Court has followed the mandate of
article VI, section 13 in reviewing cases of jury instruction error
that relate to permissible inferences" or to the weight that should
be given to certain testimony."l The court, however, has persist-
ently failed to follow article VI, section 13 in cases where: (1) an
instruction is given which, if followed, would permit the jury to
base a verdict on an incorrect statement of law, or on a theory for
which the evidence was legally insufficient;17 (2) an instruction is
14.. 46 Cal. 2d at 837, 299 P.2d at 255. Professor Saltzburg suggests that in criminal
cases a standard of reasonable possibility rather than reasonable probability be used- an-
other small but crucial change. Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 1021-22. The Watson court con-
sidered and rejected such a rule: "[T]he test... . must necessarily be based upon reasona-
ble probabilities rather than upon mere possibilities; otherwise the entire purpose of [article
VI, § 13] would be defeated." 46 Cal. 2d at 837, 299 P.2d at 255. Nonetheless, the California
Supreme Court has sometimes based reversals on the mere possibility of error. See text
accompanying notes 23-48 infra.
15. People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 830-32, 299 P.2d 243, 250-52 (1956). In Watson,
the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction that, where a criminal case rests on
circumstancial evidence, each necessary fact in the chain of evidence must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. Applying its own rule, the Watson court examined the record and held
the error harmless.
16. One such instruction relates to the weight the jury should give to testimony of an
expert. California Penal Code § 1127b (West 1970) requires such an instruction whenever an
expert has testified in a criminal case. Rather than presume prejudice from the failure of the
trial court to obey the statute, the courts follow art. VI, § 13 and examine the "entire cause,
including the evidence." The reviewing courts reverse only if they determine that "the jury
might have rendered a different verdict had the omitted instruction been given." People v.
Lynch, 14 Cal. App. 3d 602, 610, 92 Cal. Rptr. 411, 416 (1971) (quoting People v. Bowens,
229 Cal. App. 2d 590, 600, 40 Cal. Rptr. 435, 441-42 (1964)). See also People v. Morris, 110
Cal. App. 2d 469, 478, 243 P.2d 66, 72-73 (1952).
Failure to instruct the jury on the weight it should give the testimony of an accomplice
is treated in a similar manner, with Watson's different result test being applied. See People
v. Gordon, 10 Cal. 3d 460, 470-71, 516 P.2d 298, 304, 110 Cal. Rptr. 906, 911-12 (1973). The
test developed in Watson was also applied in cases involving a violation of the former rule
that the court must instruct the jury to view with caution the testimony of a rape victim.
People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 872-73, 538 P.2d 247, 252-53, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119,
124-25 (1975).
17. See, e.g., Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 595 P.2d 975, 196 Cal. Rptr.
198 (1979); LeMons v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 21 Cal. 3d 869, 582 P.2d 946,
148 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1978); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1972). For a discussion of these cases, see text accompanying notes 26-42 infra.
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omitted which would relate to a theory of law for which there is
support in the evidence and which, if applied, would have resulted
in a more favorable verdict for the appellant, such as an instruc-
tion on partial defenses or lesser included offenses;18 or (3) the trial
court gives the Allen charge, a formerly proper instruction given to
deadlocked juries."'
In cases involving these kinds of error, the California Supreme
Court has announced rules of prejudice per se-prejudice pre-
sumed from error-notwithstanding that such rules are contrary to
article VI, section 13 and People v. Watson. While article VI, sec-
tion 13 requires the reviewing court to examine "the entire cause,
including the evidence," a rule of prejudice per se orders reversal
baAed on only one part of the record-the error itself. Moreover,
even though Watson required that in order to reverse the court
must determine that a different result would have been reasonably
probable absent the error, a rule of prejudice per se orders the
court to reverse without regard to the effect of the error on the
result.
The approach of the court has been to use one of two methods
to circumvent the constitutional rule: (1) the ipse dixit 20 ap-
proach, in which the court, without support from its own analysis
of the record, attempts to satisfy the Watson test by transmuting
its own determination that the error possibly was prejudicial into a
holding that it probably was prejudicial; 21 or (2) the court purports
to harmonize article VI, section 13 with a rule of prejudice per se
18. See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1975); People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 518 P.2d 913, 12 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974); People v.
Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963). For a discussion of Modesto,
see text accompanying notes 49-58 infra.
19. People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977). For a
discussion of Gainer, see text accompanying notes 59-65 infra.
The California Supreme Court does not acknowledge the existence of specially treated
classes of cases as described in the text. As will be seen, the court argues or implies that
these cases are consistent with art. VI, § 13 and with the Watson rule. See text accompany-
ing notes 26-75 infra. Accordingly, the court does not discuss its rationale for treating errors
in instructions of law as the proper subject of a presumption of prejudice, when, at the same
time, violations of a statutory right to instruction on the weight of factual evidence are not
subject to a presumption of prejudice. See, e.g., People v. Lynch, 14 Cal. App. 3d 602, 609-
10, 92 Cal. Rptr. 411, 415-16 (1971). Perhaps the distinction is related to the presumption
that the jury honors its duty to follow instructions of law, but itself is the absolute arbiter of
factual issues. See TRAYNOR, supra note 2, at 73-74; 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE
3035 (1971).
20. "Ipse dixit" refers to any assertion made without proof or authority.
21. See text accompanying notes 26-48 infra.
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by emphasizing the "miscarriage of justice" language of that sec-
tion and omitting to mention the requirement that in each case the
court review "the entire cause, including the evidence."22
Three justices of the California Supreme Court recently noted
that the court frequently ignores the constitutional mandate of ar-
ticle VI, section 13.23 Although the court has never acknowledged
that it is ignoring that mandate, an analysis of the court's decisions
supports the justices' view.
The Ipse Dixit Approach
Under the test set forth in People v. Watson, for an error to
be held prejudicial and require reversal, reasonable probability 8f a
different result must be noted. 4 Mere possibility is insufficient.25
In the cases analyzed here, however, the California Supreme Court
admits that it cannot tell whether a different verdict would have
occurred, or states that the jury may have based its verdict on an
erroneous instruction. This language describes possibility; it does
not describe probability. 2 Yet in each case, the court then jumps,
ipse dixit, to the assertion prescribed by Watson that a different
verdict would have been reasonably probable absent the error.
This Note refers to this matrix of contradictory assertions as the
ipse dixit approach.
Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co.,27 decided in 1979, is an example
of the ipse dixit approach used by the California Supreme Court.
In an action for false arrest, the trial judge instructed the jury that
a shoplifting arrest by a store employee was lawful if the employee
had probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed
in his presence. The instruction was wrong: a private citizen may
arrest only if an offense is actually committed in his or her pres-
ence;28 a store employee can detain, but not arrest, on probable
22. See text accompanying notes 49-65 infra.
23. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 77-78, 609 P.2d 468, 515-16, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 47-48
(1980) (concurring and dissenting opinion of Richardson, J., joined by Clark and Manuel,
JJ.).
24. 46 Cal. 2d at 836, 299 P.2d at 254.
25. Id. at 837, 299 P.2d at 255.
26. The verb "may" expresses contingency or possibility. See RANDOM HousE DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 886 (1967).
27. 24 Cal. 3d 579, 595 P.2d 975, 196 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1979).




cause alone;2 9 and only a peace officer may arrest on mere probable
cause.30 The jury in Cervantez returned a general verdict for the
defendant store and employees. In determining that prejudicial
error had occurred because of the erroneous instruction, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court observed that one possible basis for the ver-
dict was that "on the evidence before it the jury could have found
that plaintiff committed no offense in [the employee's] presence,
but that [the employee] had probable cause to believe that plain-
tiff did so."31 The jury might then have invoked the incorrect in-
struction-that probable cause justifies an arrest by a private citi-
zen-to return a verdict for the defendants. On the other hand, the
verdict may have been based on a finding by the jury that the
plaintiff actually had committed a crime in the presence of the
employee, in which case the verdict was proper and was unaffected
by the erroneous instruction.
The opinion of the California Supreme Court suggests no rea-
son to believe that the jury invoked the incorrect statement of law
in reaching its verdict.3 2 Nonetheless, the court reversed, reasoning
that "[s]ince the defense verdict may have been based on this erro-
neous theory, it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to plaintiff would have been reached in the absence of
29. E.g., Collyer v. S.H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 180-81, 54 P.2d 20, 23 (1936). The
merchant's authority is now statutory. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.5(e) (West Supp. 1980).
30. Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 587, 595 P.2d 975, 979, 196 Cal. Rptr.
198, 202 (1979). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(1) (West 1970).
31. 24 Cal. 3d at 591, 595 P.2d at 982, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 205. This was the basis of the
verdict if the jury believed the uncorroborated testimony of the plaintiff. The court failed to
point out, however, that if the jury had believed the contrary testimony of the defendant
and another witness, it had no need to apply the incorrect instruction and still would have
reached the same verdict.
32. The only analysis by the court is the passage quoted in the text accompanying
note 31 supra: "On the evidence before it, the jury could have found that plaintiff com-
mitted no offense. . . ." This is an evaluation only of the evidence favoring the appellant.
The "could have" language is akin to a conclusion that the evidence was legally sufficient to
support a verdict on that theory, or that substantial evidence supported such a finding,
conclusions based on an analysis only of the evidence favoring one party.
The concepts of "substantial evidence" and "legal sufficiency" are alien to harmless
error analysis. Justice Traynor explained: "Such a court leaps from an acceptable premise,
that a trier of fact could reasonably believe the isolated evidence, to the dubious conclusion
that the trier of fact reasonably rejected everything that controverted the isolated evi-
dence." TRAYNOR, supra note 2, at 27. Justice Sullivan similarly has stated that a sufficiency
of the evidence standard "is not applicable [to harmless error analysis] and certainly will
not permit us to shortcut our constitutional duty to examine the entire record so as to
determine the effect of the challenged instruction." Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12
Cal. 3d 663, 673-74, 527 P.2d 353, 359-60, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7-8 (1974).
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the error."33 The critical verb "may" does not connote probability
but rather mere possibility. Yet the court transmuted possibility
into probability and reversed the lower court decision. The court
cited Watson and article VI, section 13, but in fact it did not fol-
low those authorities. Watson directs the court to determine
whether it is reasonably probable that the error resulted in a dif-
ferent verdict, expressly rejecting the mere possibility of prejudice
as a sufficient basis for reversal. 4 The conclusion of the Cervantez
court that the evidence "could have" led the jury to the erroneous
theory, and that the verdict "may" have been based on the errone-
ous theory, does not satisfy the standard of Watson, despite the
citation of Watson in the opinion. In Cervantez, the California
Supreme Court presumed prejudice upon a determination that
prejudice possibly occurred. This is the very presumption that ar-
ticle VI, section 13 was intended to preclude.
The error in Cobbs v. Grant,35 a medical malpractice action,
was slightly different than that in Cervantez. In Cervantez, the
trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the law, but the error
could have resulted in prejudicial effect only if the jury made one
of two findings of fact, both of which were adequately supported
by the evidence. The California Supreme Court presumed that the
jury accepted the evidence that led to an application of the errone-
ous instruction. In Cobbs, the trial court gave correct instructions
on two alternative theories of law, one of which was unsupported
by the evidence. The California Supreme Court presumed that the
jury returned its verdict on the theory unsupported by the evi-
dence, rather than on the alternative, adequately supported theory.
The court in Cobbs stated that it was "impossible to deter-
mine"36 on which theory the jury had based its verdict in favor of
the plaintiff-either the legally correct and factually sufficient the-
ory of lack of informed consent, or the correctly stated but inade-
quately supported theory of negligent performance. The court rea-
soned, therefore, that it should presume prejudice and reverse the
judgment: "Since it is impossible to determine on which theory
the jury verdict rested, we conclude it is reasonably probable there
has been a miscarriage of justice. We therefore reverse the
33. 24 Cal. 3d at 591, 595 P.2d at 982, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (citations omitted; empha-
sis added).
34. 46 Cal. 2d at 837, 299 P.2d at 255.
35. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).




As did the Cervantez court, the court in Cobbs cited both
Watson and article VI, section 13, and couched its analysis in
Watson's "reasonably probable" language. It is apparent from the
quoted passage, however, that the court could not actually have
determined that it was "reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the
absence of the error." 8 On the contrary, the court forthrightly
admitted that it was "impossible to determine" whether the error
had affected the verdict.39
To reverse a verdict when it is impossible to determine
whether an error was prejudicial is to presume prejudice from
error. This is precisely the presumption that article VI, section 13
was meant to abrogate, yet this is what the California Supreme
Court did in Cobbs. It may be that a presumption of prejudice dis-
courages error at trial and otherwise serves fairness, 0 however,
such a presumption is inconsistent with the California Con-
stitution.
LeMons v. Regents of the University of California,'4 1 another
medical malpractice action, is similar to Cobbs in that the trial
court correctly instructed the jury on two alternate legal theories,
one of which had no support in the evidence. The general verdict
for the defendant doctor was valid if based on a finding that he
was not negligent, but invalid if based on the unsupported theory
of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The court
had instructed the jury on both theories.
After a thorough examination of the record, the California Su-
preme Court concluded that the erroneously given, though sub-
stantively correct, instruction "may have misled the jury.' 42 This
assertion of possible prejudice falls short of an "'opinion, that it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached in the absence of the error,'
4
37. Id.
38. People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (1956). See text accom-
panying notes 11-14 supra.
39. 8 Cal. 3d at 238, 502 P.2d at 7, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
40. See text accompanying notes 78-79 infra.
41. 21 Cal. 3d 869, 582 P.2d 946, 148 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1978).
42. Id. at 878, 582 P.2d at 951, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (emphasis added).
43. People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (1956). See text accom-
panying notes 11-14 supra.
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which is the determination required by the California Constitution
as interpreted in Watson. The LeMons court ignored these re-
quirements and reversed the trial court verdict, making the leap
from the mere possibility of prejudice, "may have misled," to the
conclusory statement, "This error was prejudicial."' 4 Such a con-
clusion, supported only by the possibility of prejudice, is not con-
sistent with Watson's interpretation of article VI, section 13, be-
cause it does not satisfy the test of reasonable probability of a
different result. -
In Dawkins v. City of Los Angeles, 5 the California Supreme
Court determined that the trial court erred by omitting an instruc-
tion of law that should have been given. After describing the mere
possibility that the error was harmful, the court recited the conclu-
sion in Watson language that the error probably was harmful and
reversed the verdict.
46
The jury in Dawkins awarded damages to the plaintiff upon a
general verdict of false arrest. In reviewing the evidence, the su-
preme court held that the detention of the plaintiff was justified as
a matter of law, but that the evidence could support a finding ei-
ther way on the lawfulness of the more intrusive arrest.4 7 There-
fore, it was error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury
that the detention was lawful, but it was proper for the court to
submit the issue of false arrest to the jury.
The law presumes from a general verdict that the jury made
all the findings necessary to support the verdict, provided only, as
in Dawkins, that the evidence is sufficient to support such find-
ings.48 In discussing the possibility that the error might have been
prejudicial, the Dawkins court suggested nothing to rebut that pre-
sumption. It could point to no erroneous instruction that might
have tainted the verdict because none was given. Instead, the court
envisaged this chain of events: although the jury was instructed on
the difference between a detention and an arrest, "the jury might
44. 21 Cal. 3d at 878, 582 P.2d at 951, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
45. 22 Cal. 3d 126, 583 P.2d 711, 148 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1978).
46. Id. at 135, 583 P.2d at 716, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
47. A person may be detained by a peace officer under California law if the officer has
a rational, good faith suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity. This is held
to be a less rigorous standard that the probable cause required to effect a full arrest. Id. at
133, 583 P.2d at 714, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 860. See In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 893, 582 P.2d
957, 959, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368 (1978).
48. E.g., Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 673, 527 P.2d 353, 359, 117
Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1974). See generally 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 3072 (1971).
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nevertheless have determined that the detention was unlawful, and
that therefore it followed without more that the arrest was also
invalid."4 In other words, the jury might have ignored the instruc-
tion distinguishing detention from arrest and reached a verdict of
false arrest on less than all the necessary findings. The frailty of
this analysis as a basis for reversal is that the risk of the jury ig-
noring an instruction exists in every case. The California Supreme
Court gave no reason to believe that the risk was greater in
Dawkins than in any other case. The mere possibility of prejudicial
error is all that the court raised in support of its conclusion of rea-
sonable probability that the verdict would have been different but
for the error. Such reasoning is tantamount to a presumption of
prejudice, even though the conclusion of the Dawkins court para-
phrases Watson, which forbids such a presumption."
It might be argued that in Cervantez, Cobbs, LeMons, and
Dawkins the California Supreme Court was merely developing a
new interpretation of article VI, section 13-that there is a "mis-
carriage of justice" whenever a jury instruction error relating to
law possibly misled the jury. The court is not free to disapprove
the language of the California Constitution, the argument runs, but
nothing binds the court to its earlier definitions of terms such as
"miscarriage of justice." Therefore, the court is free to make Wat-
son and its progeny inapplicable to certain kinds of jury instruc-
tion error, substituting a directive that courts should declare a
"miscarriage of justice" whenever it is merely possible, rather than
reasonably probable, that a result more favorable to the appellant
would have been reached absent the error.
On the other hand, if the California Supreme Court were lim-
iting Watson, one of the most cited cases in California court opin-
ions,51 it certainly is reasonable to expect that the court would be
explicit. Cervantez, -Cobbs, Dawkins, and scores of other cases con-
tinue to cite Watson and use the Watson "reasonably probable"
formula-all indicating that the court had no intention of narrow-
ing Watson.
Moreover, the language and history of article VI, section 13
foreclose the argument that Watson has been overruled sub silen-
49. 22 Cal. 3d at 135, 583 P.2d at 716, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
50. People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (1956). See text accompa-
nying notes 11-14 supra.
51. Watson was cited for its harmless error rule over 100 times by California appellate
courts between April, 1977, and June, 1980.
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tio. The section abrogated the 19th century rule that prejudice is
presumed from error; however, it is apparent that the cases which
replace the Watson rule make just that presumption. The neces-
sary conclusion is that the Watson rule is still valid even though it
is often ignored without explanation.
Harmonizing a Rule of Prejudice Per Se With Article VI,
Section 13
The California Supreme Court has purported to harmonize a
rule of prejudice per se with article VI, section 13 in a number of
its decisions. Because article VI, section 13 requires that in all
cases the appellate justices must review "the entire cause, includ-
ing the evidence," before reversing, the court must resort to judi-
cial sleight of hand to justify a rule that holds a certain error prej-
udicial regardless of what else occurred at trial.
This first occured in 1963 in Justice Traynor's opinion for the
court in People v. Modesto.52 The Modesto court presented this
rationale for its rule of prejudice per se:
In People v. Carmen ... we held it reversible error to refuse a
manslaughter instruction when there is any evidence that would
warrant a conviction of manslaughter. Reversal is not required
because of a reasonable probability that in the absence of the er-
ror the jury would have reached a different verdict (see People v.
Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, [299 P.2d 443]), but because the de-
fendant has a constitutional right to have the jury determine
every material issue presented by the evidence. Regardless of how
overwhelming the evidence of guilt may be, the denial of such a
fundamental right cannot be cured by article VI, section [13], of
the California Constitution, for the denial of such a right itself is
52. 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963). One earlier California Su-
preme Court case, People v. Carmen, 36 Cal. 2d 768, 228 P.2d 281 (1951), had adopted the
same rule, holding it prejudicial per se for a trial court to fail to instruct on a lesser included
offense. The Carmen court, however, failed to undertake any harmless error analysis or even
to mention art. VI, § 13 (then § 41/2). In vigorous dissent, three justices noted: "[I]t clearly
appears that there is not the slightest possibility that the jury would have brought in a
different verdict had an instruction on involuntary manslaughter been given. . . .[This] is
precisely the type of error to which the constitutional provision was directed, and. . . it is
our duty under the constitutional mandate to affirm the judgment of conviction of first
degree murder." Id. at 787, 228 P.2d at 293 (dissenting opinion of Spence, J., joined by
Shenk and Edmonds, JJ.). In the 12 years between the Carmen opinion in 1951 and the
Modesto case in 1963, Carmen was cited by the supreme court only once on this point, and
then as dictum. See People v. Zilbauer, 44 Cal. 2d 43, 49, 279 P.2d 534, 537 (1955).
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a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of that provision."
In this passage, Justice Traynor used a two-step analysis in his
attempt to avoid article VI, section 13 and its prohibition of a rule
of prejudice per se. He first implied that there exists a constitu-
tional right to a fully instructed jury. Second, he declared that
"the denial of such a right itself is a miscarriage of justice within
the meaning of [article VI, section 13]."51
Of course, the United States and California Constitutions
guarantee a jury trial to a criminal accused.55 In a crucial shading
of meaning, however, Justice Traynor referred to this right as the
"constitutional right to have the jury determine every material is-
sue presented by the evidence."5 That is not the wording of either
constitution, and the wording used yields a change in the meaning
critical to Justice Traynor's result.
The jury in Modesto was properly instructed that a finding of
malice is essential for conviction of murder. The evidence in Mo-
desto suggested that the defendant was intoxicated at the time he
committed the killings,57 but the jury did not receive an instruc-
tion relating his possible intoxication to his ability to harbor mal-
ice."8 Because a murder verdict was returned, it is presumed that
the jury made a finding of malice.5 Still, it can be argued that an
instruction specifically linking the evidence of intoxication to the
legal absence of malice might have caused the jury to reach a dif-
ferent verdict. The erroneous failure to give such an instruction
may well have been prejudicial because it may have resulted in the
jury not considering the possible intoxication of the defendant as
evidence of lack of malice. Whether the error was prejudicial, how-
ever, is not the same issue as whether there was a jury trial.
Taking the example of the Modesto case, the effect of Justice
53. 59 Cal. 2d at 730, 382 P.2d at 38, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (citations omitted).
54. Id.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
56. 59 Cal. 2d at 730, 382 P.2d at 38, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
57. Modesto admitted killing the nine-year-old and twelve-year-old daughters of his
neighbor by hitting them repeatedly with a sledge hammer. He may have drunk as many as
18 cans of beer after noon that day. The killings occurred between 11:30 p.m. and 2 a.m. Id.
at 725-28, 382 P.2d at 35-37, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 227-29.
58. Under California law, evidence of intoxication is admissible for the purpose of
showing that the defendant was incapable of harboring malice at the time of a killing. A
finding of malice is necessary for a conviction of murder, but not of manslaughter. See
generally People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 731-34, 336 P.2d 492, 501-03 (1959).
59. See note 48 & accompanying text supra.
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Traynor's subtle rewording becomes clear: the defendant has had
a jury trial in which the jury made all necessary findings, including
malice. However, the jury may have overlooked an issue such as
defendant's intoxication because of the court's erroneous failure to
instruct on the effect of intoxication. Therefore, the defendant's
"right" to have the jury fully consider every factual issue may not
have been satisfied, although his right to a jury trial certainly was
satisfied.
As the second step of his analysis, Justice Traynor considered
the denial of this new right to a fully instructed jury in light of
article VI, section 13. The denial of the right to a fully instructed
jury, he asserted, is itself a "miscarriage of justice" within the
meaning of that provision. Of course, article VI, section 13 does
require a conclusion of "miscarriage of justice" in order to set aside
a verdict, but the meaning of that phrase must be considered in
light of its context in the section. The required conclusion is not
simply "miscarriage"; the reviewing court must determine that
"the error complained of has resulted" in a miscarriage. The error
and the miscarriage are not the same thing: the latter must result
from the former. Moreover, Justice Traynor's analysis ignores the
requirement of article VI, section 13 that the court examine the
entire record. That requirement precludes an appellate court's dec-
laration of a miscarriage of justice based on the presence of error
alone.
Justice Traynor wrote elsewhere that "justice" is such a vague
term that it cannot be limited in application to the result of a par-
ticular case, 0 and must be extended to allow an interpretation of
article VI, section 13 in which the error alone creates the miscar-
riage of justice, even though the result would have been unaffected
in its absence.6 1 The problem with the "itself a miscarriage" analy-
sis, however, is not that the word "justice" is not broad enough to
encompass a rule of prejudice per se. The problem is that article
VI, section 13 requires the reviewing court to examine the entire
record, whereas Modesto and other cases establishing rules of
prejudice per se require reversal regardless of such an examination.
The Modesto rule is not consistent with article VI, section 13, de-
spite Justice Traynor's attempt to harmonize the two.
The Modesto case became controlling precedent, however, and
60. TRAYNOR, supra note 2, at 17.
61. See, e.g., People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956).
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California courts regularly follow it, with slight modification, 2 in
cases involving failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included of-
fense, rather than abiding by the mandate of article VI, section
13.63
People v. Gainer64 is another case in which the California Su-
preme Court purported to harmonize a rule of prejudice per se
with article VI, section 13 by means of the "itself a miscarriage"
rationale. The trial courts in Gainer and the many cases reversed
because of Gainer5 made no errors of substantive law in the jury
instructions and omitted no material instructions. The cases were
reversed because the court gave the instruction known as the "Al-
len charge" or "dynamite charge."66 That instruction was valid in
California until Gainer and was used as a way of breaking one-
sided jury deadlocks.6 7 Upon learning of a one-sided deadlock, but
without knowing which side was favored, the judge would urge
holdout jurors to reconsider their views in light of the majority po-
62. Modesto was overruled in part by People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 720-21, 518
P.2d 913, 924-25, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 12-13 (1974), which held that the Modesto rule need not
apply in the rare case where it can be determined from the nature of the verdicts on other
charges or against other defendants that the jury rejected the evidence on which conviction
of a lesser included offense could have been based. Such a case is so unusual that Modesto
remains good law in almost every case.
63. See generally People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d. 143, 157-58, 542 P.2d 1337, 1347,
125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 754-55 (1975). See also People v. Horn, 12 Cal. 3d 290, 300-01, 524 P.2d
1300, 1306-07, 115 Cal. Rptr. 516, 522-23 (1974); People v. Medina, 78 Cal. App. 3d 1000,
1005, 144 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583 (1978).
64. 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977).
65. The holding of Gainer was controversial because the court gave it retroactive
effect, commanding its application to all cases not then final on appeal. Id. at 853, 566 P.2d
at 1007, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 871. At least 42 felony convictions, including 20 homicide convic-
tions, were reversed because the trial court had given an instruction-the Allen
charge-which was proper at the time of trial. Petition for Hearing in the Supreme Court of
the State of California at 28-29, People v. Remiro, 89 Cal. App. 3d 809, 153 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1979). The California Supreme Court denied the petition for hearing, and the -People's peti-
tion for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Remiro v. California,
444 U.S. 876 (1979).
The reversal as to one defendant in Remiro on the basis of the Gainer rule particularly
caused public outcry because of the complexity and length of the trial, and because the case
involved the murder of a popular public official, Oakland Schools Superintendent Marcus
Foster. See note 82 & accoinpanying text infra.
66. Petition for Hearing in the Supreme Court of the State of California at 28, People
v. Remiro, 89 Cal. App. 3d 809, 153 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1979). For a thorough discussion of the
origins and development of the Allen charge, see People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 843-47,
566 P.2d 997, 1000-03, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861, 864-67 (1977).
67. See People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 844, 566 P.2d 997, 1001, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861,
865 (1977). In the Gainer trial, the jury reported an eleven-to-one deadlock without re-
vealing which verdict was favored.
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sition because "the case must at some time be decided," 8 and, "it
is your duty to decide the case if you can conscientiously do so."6
In Gainer, the California Supreme Court declared that giving
the Allen charge is per se prejudicial error. The court stated, "[I]t
is difficult if not impossible to ascertain if in fact prejudice oc-
curred; yet it is very likely that it did. We conclude that a convic-
tion following such a charge [to a deadlocked jury] is a 'miscarriage
of justice' within the meaning of article VI, section 13. ''10
The language resembles that of Justice Traynor's opinion in
Modesto,7 1 in that it attempts to harmonize a rule of prejudice per
se with article VI, section 13 by stating that a particular error al-
ways is associated with a miscarriage of justice. The giving of the
Allen charge, rather than a review of the entire cause, is the only
predicate of reversal. There is no review of the entire cause, al-
though such a review is required by article VI, section 13. Thus the
rule announced in Gainer is inconsistent with article VI, section
13, despite the statement by the Gainer court that the section sup-
ports the rule.
Case Studies-Summary
Common to all the cases analyzed in this Note is the failure of
the California Supreme Court to follow the constitutional require-
ment of examining the entire cause, or the Watson rule of reasona-
ble probability of a different verdict, or both. Yet in none of these
cases has the court cited authority for this trend in its analysis.
In Cervantez, Cobbs, LeMons, and Dawkins the court em-
ployed the ipse dixit approach.7 2 The court either admitted that it
was "impossible to determine"73 whether the error resulted in a
different outcome, or stated only that the jury verdict "may have
68. Id. at 841, 566 P.2d at 999, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
69. Id. The California Supreme Court described the instruction as inaccurate and po-
tentially coercive. Id. at 842-43, 599 P.2d at 1000, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 864. The instruction was
inaccurate because not every case is decided at some time; a prosecutor might choose not to
refile after a mistrial. Id. at 852, 599 P.2d at 1006, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 870. It was potentially
coercive because it "tempts the minority juror to relinquish his position simply because he
has been the subject of a particular instruction." Id. at 850, 566 P.2d at 1005, 139 Cal. Rptr.
at 869 (quoting U.S. v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 662 (5th Cir. 1972)).
70. 19 Cal. 3d at 855, 566 P.2d at 1008, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
71. See text accompanying notes 52-63 supra.
72. See text accompanying notes 27-51 supra.
73. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 238, 502 P.2d 1, 7, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 511 (1972).
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been based on [an] erroneous theory. ' 74 In each case, the court
then leaped from this mere possibility of prejudice to the conclu-
sion that the error probably was prejudicial. This conclusion satis-
fies the Watson rule and article VI, section 13 of the California
Constitution but is reached only by a faulty chain of logic.
Modesto and Gainer illustrate the second device of reasoning
used by the California Supreme Court in circumventing article VI,
section 13: purporting to harmonize a rule of prejudice per se with
the section by neglecting the "entire cause" provision,75 The state-
ment in Modesto that a given jury instruction error, or, in Gainer,
the conviction that follows such an error, "itself is a miscarriage of
justice within the meaning of [article VI, section 13],''6 would be
true only if some errors could be prejudicial per se under the sec-
tion. The plain meaning and the intendment of article VI, section
13 are to the contrary. A rule of prejudice per se might stand in
spite of the section, but the section itself is no authority in support
of such a rule. Moreover, Watson defined "miscarriage of justice"
under article VI, section 13 as the reasonable probability that a
different result would have been reached absent the error. In con-
trast, Modesto sets forth the error itself as the miscarriage, and
Gainer asserts that any conviction following an Allen charge is a
miscarriage of justice, regardless of what occurred during the
course of the trial. 7
Effects of the California Supreme Court's
Circumvention of the Harmless Error Rule
The departure by the California Supreme Court from the
harmless error rule arising from the California Constitution and
the Watson case has resulted in both benefits and harms. This
Note takes the position that in balancing the two, the harms weigh
more heavily.
In evaluating the effect of an error, an appellate court could
74. Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 591, 595 P.2d 975, 982, 196 Cal. Rptr.
198, 205 (1979).
75. See text accompanying notes 52-71 supra.
76. People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 730, 382 P.2d 33, 38, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225, 230
(1963).
77. For an example of the application of the Gainer rule of prejudice per se, see cases
cited at note 83 infra.
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apply various standards along a "sliding scale of probabilities." 8
Stringent rules tending to lead to reversal encourage careful pro-
tection of the rights of the parties; but they may also force a justly
prevailing party to relitigate an action because of a trivial error.
This was the state of the law in the 19th century. As the standard
runs down the scale toward more lenient rules that encourage af-
firmance, it becomes more likely that a court will uphold a judg-
ment affected by error, but less likely that a justly prevailing party
must face a retrial. In short, any shift along the scale will have
both benefits and harms. This is true of the shift that is apparent
in the recent California Supreme Court cases discussed in this
Note.
In the jury instruction cases discussed here, the California Su-
preme Court has moved along the sliding scale away from the "rea-
sonable probability" test of Watson to a "mere possibility" stan-
dard, or, even more leniently, to a presumption of prejudice. One
positive effect of this shift is the greater protection that trial courts
afford to certain substantive rights of the parties because of those
courts' aversion to reversal. The "reasonable probability of a dif-
ferent result" test of Watson and the requirement of article VI,
section 13 that the entire cause be reviewed, combine to create a
rule that does not protect certain of a litigant's substantive rights
as well as either the standard of "mere possibility" or the rule of
prejudice per se. The rule created by article VI, section 13 and
Watson leaves to the due process clause, statutes, and rules of pro-
cedure the work of protecting the judicial process from errors over
the long run. That constitutional rule examines, on a case by case
basis, the effect the error had on the verdict. Errors that do not
violate the guarantee of due process may still affect important
rights of the parties, but unless it is "reasonably probable" that
the result would have been more favorable for the appellant in
their absence, such errors are harmless. Justice Traynor, likening
errors to insects, said that such errors, "for all the benign appear-
ance of their spindly traces, mark the way for a plague of followers
that deplete trials of fairness."' In the instances in which the
- California Supreme Court has established a rule of prejudice per se
or has reversed where prejudice was merely possible, the aversion
that trial judges have to reversal may encourage them to be espe-
78. TRAYNOR, supra note 2, at 33-37.
79. Id. at 9.
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cially conscientious, thereby shutting the door to the "plague of
followers."
A second benefit of the rules of prejudice per se, with respect
particularly to misdirection of the jury, is to remove an unfair pre-
sumption of nonprejudice against an appellant where prejudice is
difficult to prove. Article VI, section 13 and the Watson rule re-
quire a positive finding that a different verdict probably resulted
from the error. Yet jury deliberations, where the effect of an erro-
neous instruction would show, are kept secret."' An appellant in-
jured by an error would face difficult problems of proof if article
VI, section 13 were applied as intended. In the instances in which
the court ignores that section, it removes this harsh presumption.
The court's circumvention of article VI, section 13 thereby protects
litigants who actually have been harmed by jury instruction error,
but who cannot affirmatively show the harm because of the rule on
secrecy of deliberations. 1
These benefits of the California Supreme Court's modifica-
tions of the constitutional harmless error rule must be weighed
against the harm caused by the substituted rule and by the man-
ner in which the court has effected the substitution. The cases in
which the California Supreme Court has circumvented the harm-
less error rule cause harm because the court (1) has adopted a rule
which sometimes forces a justly prevailing party to endure a re-
trial; (2) has shifted away from the standard set by the California
Constitution; and (3) has failed to make clear why it has done so
and, hence, when it will do so in future cases. Such harm is serious
and outweighs the benefits of the court's approach. Judgments of
guilt or liability are reversed despite the harmlessness of the error,
shaking public confidence in the system of justice. The court's con-
duct damages the integrity of the political process by intruding on
the separation of powers. Because of the weakness of its reasoning,
,the court erodes its own credibility. By failing to discuss fully what
80. California Evidence Code § 1150(a) (West 1966) states in part: "No evidence is
admissible to show the effect of statements made, or conduct, condition, or events occurring,
either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the
verdict improperly or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined." Section
1150(b) continues: "Nothing in this code affects the law relating to the competence of a
juror to give evidence to impeach or support a verdict." In California, a juror is incompetent
to give evidence as to subjective matters that might have affected his or her verdict. Id.
§ 1150(b). See People v. Gray, 61 Cal. 164, 183 (1882); see also Silverhart v. Mount Zion
Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971).
81. See note 80 supra.
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it is doing, the court deprives bench and bar of a rational body of
precedent, thereby increasing the risk of inconsistent justice.
The rules of prejudice per se result in the reversal of cases
where guilt or liability has been amply shown. 2 For example, a
justice of the California Court of Appeal, acting under the compul-
sion of the per se rule of Gainer, wrote that a particular verdict
must be reversed "not because justice requires it but because
chance has ordained it." 3 The decision to reverse in a criminal
case without regard to the overwhelming nature of the evidence or
the apparent correctness of the verdict is the decision, in short, to
permit a person who has been shown to have committed a crime to
escape the lawful result of a verdict of guilty. There is social cost
to giving finality to a verdict following a trial in which there has
been error, but there also is social cost to reversing a verdict which
would have been the same without the error. As Professor
Saltzburg has observed, "[u]nwarranted reversals precipitated the
legislative backlash against the old harmless error rules.
'8 4
In selectively enforcing the harmless error rule of the Califor-
nia Constitution, the California Supreme Court has usurped an
area of law that the will of the people formerly occupied. It is a
principle of our constitutional system that the people, by placing
article VI, section 13 in their constitution, put the provision in the
hands of the judiciary to interpret, but not to abrogate.8 5 The Call-
82. See, e.g., People v. Carmen, 36 Cal. 2d 768, 787, 228 P.2d 281, 293 (1951) (Spence,
J., concurring and dissenting, discussed at note 52 supra); People v. Remiro, 89 Cal. App. 3d
809, 821, 153 Cal. Rptr. 89, 98, cert. denied sub nom.), Remiro v. California, 444 U.S. 876
(1979) (discussed at note 83 infra).
83. People v. Remiro, 89 Cal. App. 3d 809, 821, 153 Cal. Rptr. 89, 98, cert. denied sub
nom. Remiro v. California, 444 U.S. 876 (1979). At the time of the trial in Remiro, Gainer
had not yet been decided and the Allen charge still was permitted. The trial in Remiro took
46 days and involved over 500 exhibits and 137 witnesses. At 9 a.m. one morning during the
jury deliberations, the judge gave the Allen charge in response to a reported deadlock. The
jurors continued deliberating until 6:30 p.m., nine-and-one-half hours later, when they
asked that two other instructions, both proper, be reread. Neither was the Allen charge, but
one was an alternative to the Allen charge specifically approved in Gainer. Less than thirty
minutes later, the jury returned guilty verdicts. Id. at 817-20 & nn. 1, 2, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
96-98. Both the lengthy deliberations after the Allen charge was read and the speed with
which verdicts were reached after the other instructions were given suggest that the Allen
charge had little effect on the verdicts. Nonetheless, the California Court of Appeal was
compelled by Gainer to presume that the Allen charge was prejudicial.
84. Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 1027.
85. Interpretation by the court could even lead to limiting the effect of art. VI, § 13 if
this were necessary to harmonize it with a coequal provision of the California Constitution,
such as its due process clauses. See CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 15. Although the meaning of the
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fornia Supreme Court has done much more than just interpret. By
establishing rules of prejudice per se, the court has ignored the
mandate of the California Constitution. Only authority superior or
coordinate to article VI, section 13 could justify such action, but
the court cites none. Whatever the merits of the modifications "en-
acted" by the court, the fact they are made without authority
harms the balance of the political process.
The erosion of the constitutional rule has been accomplished
in cases marred by faulty logic and poor statutory interpretation.
In the ipse dixit cases,"' the court used fallacious logic, leaping
from a determination of possible prejudice to a conclusion of prob-
able prejudice. In the cases purporting to harmonize a rule of
prejudice per se with article VI, section 13,87 the court interpreted
a section of the California Constitution to mean what it plainly
does not. The long-term effect of this practice is to raise questions
about the sincerity of the court. In our constitutional system,
under which the majority rules but the individual has rights, ap-
pellate courts often must interpose the solemn respectability of the
judiciary to protect the rights of an unpopular appellant. The
ability of a court to do this depends upon its credibility and the
public perception of its sincerity. Sincerity and credibility are the
capital of appellate justice. When a court substitutes ipse dixit for
sound logic or disregards the plain meaning of law enacted by the
people, it squanders that capital.
The California Supreme Court has failed to point out that it
does not always follow the constitutional harmless error rule.
Therefore, of course, it has failed to be specific about when and for
what reasons the rule will not be applied. Well written, clearly rea-
soned opinions have the value of indicating to litigants and lower
courts how the law should be applied in future cases, as well as
signaling the direction in which the law is moving. Conversely, the
failure to note or explain exceptions to the general rule or the ap-
parently .controlling precedent can lead to unpredictable decisions
state due process clause has so far been treated as identical to that of the federal due pro-
cess clause, this need not be so. See Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 366-67 &
n.21, 521 P.2d 441, 449-50, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449, 457-58 (1974). Because the rules of prejudice
per se operate in somewhat the same way as rules of due process, a court could argue that
the state due process clause, as a coequal part of the California Constitution, modifies the
otherwise clear meaning of art. VI, § 13.
86. See text accompanying notes 27-51 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 52-71 supra.
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Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Company88 is an instructive
example. In Aceves, the trial judge erred in a material instruction
of law by assigning the burden of proof on a central issue of fact to
the defendant, when actually the plaintiff had the burden."9 De-
pending on how the jury found the facts, the verdict may or may
not have been based on the incorrect instruction. In this respect,
the case is the exact analogue of Cervantez90 and is quite similar to
Cobbs and LeMons.91 In such cases, the California Supreme Court
has consistently ignored article VI, section 13, presumed the error
to be prejudicial, and reversed the judgment. In Aceves, however,
the supreme court applied the section and the Watson rule, hold-
ing the error harmless and affirming the verdict.
9 2
Aceves is an aberration. It is one of only a few cases in recent
years in which the California Supreme Court held harmless an
erroneous instruction on a material point of law.9 It cannot be ar-
88. 24 Cal. 3d 502, 595 P.2d 619, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1979).
89. The plaintiff Aceves was an employee of an independent contractor engaged in
demolishing a building owned by defendant Regal Pale and others. Aceves was seriously
injured while working and sought damages from Regal Pale for negligence on a "peculiar
risk" theory. One factual issue was the negligence of Aceves' employer, a nonparty. Negli-
gence of a third party usually is pleaded as an affirmative defense by a defendant to negate
the claim of its own negligence. The defendant then carries the burden of proof on this
issue. Here, however, Aceves sought to impose liability on Regal Pale for its failure to ensure
that its contractor (Aceves' employer) was not negligent with regard to the "peculiar risk"-
in this case, the inherently dangerous activity of building demolition. Proof of the employer-
contractor's negligence was a necessary first step in proving the owner's negligence under
this theory, accordingly the burden of proof should have been on the injured party, plaintiff
Aceves. The trial judge mistakenly instructed the jury that defendant Regal Pale bore the
burden. Id. at 507-12, 595 P.2d at 621-24, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 43-46.
Aceves won a jury verdict that held Regal Pale liable because of the negligence of
Aceves' employer. If the jury was undecided on the issue of the employer's negligence, it
reached its verdict by applying the incorrect instruction on burden of proof. However, if the
jury affirmatively found that the employer was negligent, the erroneous burden of proof
instruction had no effect.
90. See text accompanying notes 27-34 supra. Ironically, Aceves and Cervantez were
written by the same justice and published within a week of each other.
91. See text accompanying notes 35-44 supra.
92. 24 Cal. 3d at 512, 595 P.2d at 624, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
93. See also People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal 3d 672, 686-88, 504 P.2d 1256, 1265-67, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 792, 801-03 (1973); Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 6 Cal. 3d 361, 371, 491 P.2d 821,
827, 99 Cal. Rptr. 29, 35 (1971). In Cantrell, the trial court failed to instruct on the partial
defense of diminished capacity, although there was evidence supporting that theory. Rather
than presume prejudice, as Modesto requires, the court followed the Watson rule and found
the error harmless.
In Solgaard, the trial court gave an instruction relating to a theory that was not sup-
ported by any evidence. In the same situation in LeMons, the California Supreme Couri
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gued that the approach of the Aceves court was wrong, because it
followed the apparently controlling authority. Yet one familiar
with the approach of the court in other similar cases, such as
Cervantez, would have predicted that prejudice would be pre-
sumed and the verdict automatically reversed. The summary na-
ture of the discussion of the harmlessness of the error by the
Aceves court gives no explanation as to why Aceves was treated
differently-but that is just the point. The court chose not to dis-
cuss precisely what it was doing and why. Absent such reasoning
and guidance, one can expect occasional, unexplained aberrations
such as Aceves in the court's future decisions.
Conclusion
The abrogation of settled rules of common law that have
become unjust or obsolete over time is a process with a noble his-
tory. Subtle changes in the restatement of the rule or the gradual
broadening of exceptions to the rule cause old judge-made law to
give way to new judge-made law, serving fairness and increasing
respect for the judiciary.
The partial abrogation of article VI, section 13 of the Califor-
nia Constitution by the California Supreme Court cannot be de-
scribed in this way. The harmless error rule in California is not
judge-made but was enacted by a vote of the people. It is set out
for judges to interpret but not to ignore. Unlike the evolution of
the common law, the judicial abrogation, without authority, of a
section of the state constitution harms the political process and the
judicial system. In circumventing the state constitutional harmless
error rule, the California Supreme Court has invaded the province
of the people without ever stating authority for doing so.
presumed that the jury followed the unsupported theory. See text accompanying notes 41-44
supra. The Solgaard court, however, advanced the reasonable notion that "'the very fact
which makes the ... instruction erroneous-absence of any evidence to support it- sug-
gests that the jury ignored this dim will-o'-the-wisp and passed on to the tangible issues in
the case."' 6 Cal. 3d at 35, 491 P.2d at 827, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (quoting Wilkinson v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 224 Cal. App. 2d 478, 489-90, 36 Cal. Rptr. 689, 696 (1964)). This analysis
would seem to make excellent sense, but the LeMons court held otherwise.

